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Risk and time preferences
Social inﬂuence
Belief elicitation
We design an intertemporal Dictator Game to test whether Dictators modify their 
discounting behavior when their own decision is imposed on their matched Recipients. 
We run four different treatments to identify the effect of payoffs externalities from those 
related to information and beliefs. Our descriptive statistics show that Dictators display a 
marked propensity to account for the intertemporal preferences of Recipients, both in the 
presence of externalities (social motives) and/or when they know about the decisions of 
their matched partners (social inﬂuence). We also perform a structural estimation exercise 
to control for heterogeneity in risk attitudes. As for individual behavior, our estimates 
conﬁrm previous studies in that high risk aversion is associated with low discounting. As 
for social behavior, we ﬁnd that social motives outweigh social inﬂuence, especially when 
we restrict our sample to pairs of Dictators and Recipients who satisfy minimal consistency 
conditions.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the 
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
“At the ﬁrst time of sexual union the passion of the male is intense, and his time is short [...]
With the female, however, it is the contrary, for at the ﬁrst time her passion is weak, and then her time long [...]
If a male be a long-timed, the female loves him the more, but if he be short-timed, she is dissatisﬁed with him.”
[“The Kama Sutra of Vatsyayana” – Burton et al. (2009)]
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We often show concerns for others by changing the timing of a speciﬁc course of action. This happens routinely in 
household key decisions such as selling a house, investing in a pension plan or even getting divorced. The empirical 
literature on health economics has extensively studied the relationship between time preferences for one’s own private 
health and for others’ health (see Lazaro et al., 2001, 2002 or Robberstad, 2005 for earlier contributions on this area 
and Mahboub-Ahari et al., 2014 for a recent meta-analysis). It is also well documented (see, e.g., Abdellaoui et al., 2013;
Browning, 2000; Mazzocco, 2004, 2007, among others) that multi-person household saving and consumption patterns may 
strongly differ from those of single-person households, even after controlling for individual characteristics (e.g., own risk 
aversion, or discounting) of each household component. As all these examples illustrate, social (i.e., interdependent) con-
cerns may affect the timing of choices: decision makers may try to accommodate others’ intertemporal concerns, when 
decisions affect the latter’s prospects and welfare.
This paper aims at providing evidence on the effects of social preferences on intertemporal decisions. More in detail, we are 
interested in better understanding how much – and in which direction – individuals’ preferences for anticipating or delaying 
an action can be affected by the presence of payoff externalities. Clearly, our motivating examples lead to a broader concept 
of social preferences, compared with its current usage in the ﬂourishing – mainly experimental – literature on these matters, 
where social preferences are usually restricted to people’s interest on “the fairness of their own material payoff relative to the 
payoff of others...” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, p. 819). In contrast with this literature, in this paper concerns for others may 
not only involve others’ material consequences (e.g., monetary outcomes, consumption bundles), but also others’ concerns and 
inclinations, such as risk aversion or discounting. This, in turn, calls for modeling social preferences as mapped directly on 
others’ individual utilities (Harrison et al., 2014).
This modeling approach basically frames subjects’ behavior as maximizing a social welfare function, which requires an 
operational solution of the delicate issue of interpersonal comparison of utilities (which is, probably, the reason why the 
mainstream literature has always preferred to restrict the domain of social preferences to the physical outcome space). 
By contrast, the empirical literature we just cited – take, e.g. Mazzocco, 2007, eq. (3) – posits that households maximize 
a convex linear combination of the individual (“selﬁsh”) utilities of their members, which are assumed to be derived as 
different parametrizations – depending on individual characteristics – of the same functional, with weights being interpreted 
as proxies of each member’s bargaining power within the household. This is going to be the modeling approach we use in 
this paper.
Our empirical evidence comes from a multi-stage laboratory experiment where we investigate on the link between time 
and social preferences by way of Multiple Price Lists (MPLs, Holt and Laury, 2002, 2005). Since time and risk preferences 
are interwined, we follow Andersen et al. (2008) by eliciting (own) risk and time preferences by way of separate tasks in 
the ﬁrst two stages of the experiment (see also Andersen et al., 2014b; Harrison et al., 2013a, 2005 or Sutter et al., 2013
for applications of similar methods). Thus, we use MPLs to elicit risk preferences and control for the curvature of subjects’ 
utility function when estimating time preferences by way of another sequence of ten MPLs in which subjects are asked to 
choose between an immediate smaller reward and an increasingly larger later reward. The novelty of our approach relies 
on incorporating a social dimension to this protocol. Thus, once subjects have completed the ﬁrst two stages, we match 
them in pairs and assign the roles of Dictators and Recipients. Then, Dictators go through, once again, the same sequence 
of intertemporal decisions knowing that – this time – their choices may also be implemented for their assigned Recipient. 
Subjects’ information on others’ risk and time decisions and the presence of payoff externalities deﬁnes our treatment 
conditions:
1. in the baseline treatment (T0, INFO-SOCIAL), Dictators make their intertemporal choices after being informed of what 
their assigned Recipient had chosen in the ﬁrst two stages of the experiment;
2. in the BELIEF-SOCIAL treatment (T1), before deciding for the pair, Dictators go through an additional stage in which we 
elicit their beliefs on risk and time concerns of their assigned Recipient;
3. in the INFO-PRIVATE treatment (T2), subjects receive (exactly as in the baseline) information on risk/time individual 
choices of their groupmate, but no payoff externalities are imposed on others;
4. in the NO INFO-SOCIAL treatment (T3), Dictators make their intertemporal decisions for the pair without prior knowl-
edge (or elicited belief) of the Recipient’s risk/time decisions.
Our design strategy allows to tease apart social motives from social inﬂuence. The comparison between the INFO-SOCIAL 
and the INFO-PRIVATE treatments allows us to determine whether informed Dictators change their decision more often 
when they act on behalf of the pair (social motives) compared with the situation in which – whatever the reason – they 
can just mimic the behavior of their assigned Recipient (social inﬂuence), without imposing any payoff consequence on the 
latter.1 Along similar lines, we can also compare the behavior of uninformed Dictators in the BELIEF-SOCIAL and the NO 
1 The role of social inﬂuence was ﬁrst studied in Psychology by Sherif (1937) and Asch (1955). The economic literature on this topic includes papers 
on informational inﬂuence, that is, herding or observational cascades (see, e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992 or Feri et al., 2011) and normative 
inﬂuence, that is, imitation based on moral judgment (see, e.g., Hung and Plott, 2001 or Moreno and Ramos-Sosa, 2017). The interested reader on the 
comparison between these two behavioral phenomena can consult Goeree and Yariv (2015) and the references therein.
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is what Krupka and Weber (2009) label as the effect of focusing on social preferences: guessing and thinking about the 
actions of others leads – in standard Dictator games – to focus more on the social norm and, as a result, more generosity is 
observed.
Following Rodriguez-Lara (2010), our experimental design is built around the structural estimation exercise of Section 4.2, 
in which subjects’ behavior is framed by way of a convex linear combination between the (“selﬁsh”) utilities of Dictator and 
Recipient. By contrast with the literature cited earlier, here weights reﬂect the Dictator’s concerns about the Recipient’s 
risk aversion and discounting. In this respect, our identiﬁcation strategy crucially relies on the experimental design by 
manipulating subjects’ incentives and information in the various stages of the experiment.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on these matters. In Sec-
tion 3 we lay out our experimental design, whereas Section 4 reports our results. First, Section 4.1 reports some descriptive 
statistics on subjects’ behavior in the various stages of the experiment. Here we show that i) Dictators’ choices signiﬁcantly 
move in the direction of their matched Recipients in our baseline treatment; ii) social inﬂuence is another important factor 
in explaining choices, in that Dictators tend to move in the direction of Recipients also in the INFO-PRIVATE treatment and 
iii) Krupka and Weber’s 2009 focusing effect is also relevant in the absence of information in that eliciting beliefs seems to 
trigger social preferences in the BELIEF-SOCIAL, compared with the NO INFO-SOCIAL treatment.
Section 4.2 tests the robustness of our preliminary ﬁndings by way of a structural model in which we frame subjects’ 
choices within the realm of a random utility maximization problem, by which we can control for subjects’ heterogeneity 
in risk preferences. We look both at subjects’ i) individual decisions (and elicited beliefs) in Stages 1 to 3, as well as ii)
Dictators’ intertemporal choices in Stage 4. As for the former, our evidence is consistent with previous ﬁndings in that 
our subjects exhibit, on average, (Constant Relative) Risk Aversion (CRRA, Hey and Orme, 1994; Holt and Laury, 2002;
Harrison and Rutström, 2008) and non-exponential discounting (Coller et al., 2012; Benhabib et al., 2010; Andersen et 
al., 2008). In addition, we also ﬁnd (consistently with Sutter et al., 2013 and Dean and Ortoleva, 2012), that individual 
(own) risk and time preferences are strongly correlated, in that risk averse subjects are also more patient. Finally, we see 
that – once we control for risk aversion in our structural estimation – social motives outweigh both social inﬂuence and 
focusing, in that the estimated weight of the Recipient’s utility is positive and highly signiﬁcant only when externalities 
and information are both present (i.e., in our baseline treatment). By contrast, the “social inﬂuence” conjecture (proxied by 
the estimated weight for the INFO-PRIVATE treatment) is only partially validated, since the estimated coeﬃcient remains 
positive, but is only signiﬁcant at 10% conﬁdence, and only when we do not restrict our sample to pairs of Dictators and 
Recipients who satisfy minimal consistency conditions (see Section 4.1.3). Also for the focusing hypothesis, the estimated 
weight in the BELIEF-SOCIAL treatment is positive, but not signiﬁcant.
Finally, Section 5 concludes, followed by Appendices containing information on the identiﬁcation strategy, the experi-
mental instructions, the debrieﬁng questionnaire and supplementary experimental evidence.
2. Related literature
Notwithstanding our “social twist”, this paper sits squarely in the emerging literature that applies experimental methods 
to study the link between individual risk and time preferences (see, among others, Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a, 2012b; 
Halevy, 2008; Laury et al., 2012). In this respect, we borrow the methodology put forward by Andersen et al. (2008) and 
control for the curvature of the utility function when eliciting discount rates. To this aim, a double MPL is employed to elicit 
risk and time preferences independently, that is, with two separate tasks: one MPL over lotteries paid off at the time of the 
experiment (Stage 1), another intertemporal MPL of certain monetary payoffs paid off at different times (Stage 2). Similar 
methods have been employed by Andersen et al. (2006, 2014b), Harrison et al. (2005), Cheung (2015), Sutter et al. (2013)
or Frederick et al. (2002), among others.
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b), instead, apply an identiﬁcation strategy between risk and time preferences in which sub-
jects allocate a budget of tokens between risky prospects that reward at different points in time (see also Miao and Zhong, 
2015). With this design, the null hypothesis of risk neutrality is also rejected. Other methods to elicit time preferences are 
those of Benhabib et al. (2010), where subjects are asked to elicit intertemporal equivalents, i.e., the amount of money that 
received today (in the future) that would make them indifferent to some amount paid in the future (today) or Laury et al.
(2012), where the elicitation of risk preferences does not require any assumption on the form of the utility function.2
Along similar lines, we here mention an emerging literature that, by way of joint elicitation of risk and social pref-
erences, claims that the empirical content of the latter may be severely reduced by the presence of some – strategic, or 
environmental – uncertainty (Winter, 2004; Winter et al., 2008; Cabrales et al., 2008; Frignani and Ponti, 2012).3
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that elicits discount rates in a model of social preferences. The only 
related precedents we are aware of are the papers of Phelphs and Pollak (1968) and Kovarik (2009). Phelphs and Pollak
(1968) propose an intergenerational model in which each generation cares about the consumption of future generations, 
2 See also Andreoni et al. (2015) or Harrison et al. (2013a) for a discussion on the different elicitation methods.
3 Andersson et al. (2016), Chakravarty et al. (2011) and Harrison et al. (2013b) are further examples of the investigation of social preferences in the risk 
dimension.
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discounting, showing that donations in a Dictator Game decrease as the moment for receiving payments is delayed. This 
contradicts standard theories of time preferences, including exponential and hyperbolic discounting.
Last, but not least, given that our estimation strategy involves the joint elicitation of risk, time and social preferences 
by way of separate experimental tasks, our ﬁndings are to be compared with those of some recent papers that establish 
empirical correlations among these behavioral traits. In this respect, our ﬁnding are consistent with those of Sutter et 
al. (2013), in that subjects with a comparatively lower degree of risk aversion discount the future signiﬁcantly more (see also 
Burks et al., 2009 and Dean and Ortoleva, 2012). Because our debrieﬁng questionnaire collects a wide variety of individual 
characteristics, we can also establish a positive correlation between the willingness to accept the delayed payment and the 
score in the cognitive skills, also reported by Anderson et al. (2011) or Burks et al. (2009).4
3. Experimental design
3.1. Sessions
Thirteen experimental sessions were run at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics (LINEEX), at the 
Universidad de Valencia. A total of 624 subjects (48 per session) were recruited within the undergraduate population 
of the University. The experimental sessions were computerized. Instructions were read aloud and we let subjects ask 
about any doubt they may have had. All sessions ended with a debrieﬁng questionnaire to distill subjects’ individual socio-
demographics and social attitudes.5 Each session lasted, on average, 1 hour and 40 minutes.
3.2. Stages
Each subject participates to one of the four treatment conditions (T0 to T3). Stages 1 and 2 (common to all treatments) 
are used to elicit individual (own) risk and time preferences, respectively. After Stage 2, participants are matched in pairs. 
In one of the treatments (T1, labeled as BELIEF-SOCIAL), subjects face an additional stage (Stage 3) in which we elicit their 
beliefs on (own) risk and time preferences of their assigned groupmate. Then, in Stage 4 (common to all treatments), we 
assign subjects the role of Dictator and Recipient, and all subjects go again through the same sequence of decisions of 
Stage 2. Our treatment conditions (Section 3.6) determine whether the Dictators’ decision in Stage 4 is binding for the 
Recipient, and the information Dictators receive (if any) about the Recipients’ decisions in Stages 1 and 2.
3.3. Stage 1. Own risk preference elicitation
We elicit subjects’ individual risk preferences by way of a MPL in which subjects face the ordered array of binary 
lotteries of Fig. 1. As Fig. 1 shows, subjects face a sequence of 11 binary lotteries, one for each row. The entire sequence 
is characterized by the fact that the “risky” option (B) is increasingly more proﬁtable, as the probability of the highest 
prize (e 190, in our parametrization) grows in probability, and so is falling the expected payoff difference between options 
A and B. In decision 1 (11) lotteries are degenerate, giving probability 1 to the lower (larger) prize for lottery A and B, 
respectively. A risk-neutral subject should be switching from option A to B in decision 6, when the expected payoff difference 
between option A and option B goes negative. The higher the switching point, the more risk averse the subject is.
3.4. Stage 2. Individual time preference elicitation
MPLs are also used to elicit time preferences. In Stage 2 subjects go through 10 decision rounds, each of which is 
characterized by a speciﬁc time delay, τ , ranging from 1 to 180 days. For each MPL, τ , subjects face 20 binary choices, k, 




in τ days, 
where the sequence of Annual Interest Rates (AIR), ik , constant across rounds, τ , varies from 2% to 300%. Delays correspond 
to τ = 1, 3, 5, 7, 15, 30, 60, 90, 120 and 180 days. Fig. 2 reports the user interface of the MPL corresponding to a delay of 
100 days, the same used in the experimental instructions.6 Contrary to other studies (e.g., Andersen et al., 2008, 2014b; 
Coller and Williams, 1999; Coller et al., 2012) the AIR is not shown to subjects in the user interface. Another important 
difference with respect to these papers is that subjects do not make a unique intertemporal decision (with different delays 
distributed between subjects). Instead, all subjects go through all intertemporal MPLs.7
4 See Appendix D2.
5 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Translated versions of the instructions and the debrieﬁng 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.
6 The interested reader can see the full set of MPLs of Stage 2 in Appendix C (Table C1).
7 This within-subject design has been also used by Tanaka et al. (2010), Cheung (2015) and Sutter et al. (2013).
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Fig. 2. Stage 2 user interface.
Contrary to what happens in Stage 1, subjects make only one decision for MPL, in that they are simply asked to indicate 




in τ days). Thus, “time 
consistency” (see Section 4.1.3) within each MPL – but not across MPLs – is artiﬁcially imposed.
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As we explained earlier, at the end of Stage 2 subjects are matched in pairs. In one of our treatments, (T1, BELIEF-SOCIAL) 
subjects are asked to predict their matched partner’s decisions in Stages 1 and 2. Predictions are incentivized, as detailed in 
Section 3.8.
3.6. Stage 4. Social time preference elicitation
In Stage 4, for each matched pair, subjects are assigned the role of Dictator or Recipient (with the exception of T2, where 
all subjects can be considered as “Dictators” of their own fate). All subjects are reminded about their own choices in Stages 
1 and 2. Then, both Dictators and Recipients go through – once again – the same sequence of MPLs as in Stage 2.8 Subjects’ 
information on others’ risk and time preferences – together with the presence of payoff externalities – deﬁne our treatment 
conditions, as follows:
• In our baseline treatment (T0, INFO-SOCIAL: 6 sessions, 288 subjects), Dictators are informed about their partner’s 
choices in Stages 1 and 2 before making their decision for the pair.
• In the BELIEF-SOCIAL treatment (T1: 2 sessions, 96 subjects) Dictators are reminded about their own predictions of 
Stage 3 before making their decision for the pair. As in T0, the Dictator’s decision has payoff consequences for the pair 
in that the Dictator’s choice imposes a payoff externality on the Recipient.
• In the INFO-PRIVATE treatment (T2: 3 sessions, 144 subjects), all subjects receive information about the decision of 
their matched partner in Stages 1 and 2 exactly as in T0, but no payoff externalities are imposed. Thus, all subjects 
choose again across all 10 decision rounds, τ , the payoff they would like to receive for themselves (as in Stage 2).
• In the NO-INFO-SOCIAL treatment (T3: 2 sessions, 96 subjects), neither Dictators receive information about the Recip-
ients’ previous decisions, nor we elicit the Dictators’ beliefs about Recipients’ behavior in Stages 1 and 2. By analogy 
with treatments T0 and T1, Dictators’ decisions have payoff consequences for their matched Recipients.
Fig. 3 reports the Stage 4 user interface for our baseline treatment (INFO-SOCIAL). As Fig. 3 shows, the top (bottom) 
screen provides information about the lottery (intertemporal) choices of Stage 1 and 2, for both the deciding subject 
(Player A) and her assigned partner (Player B), where the information about the latter refers to the Recipient’s actual choice 
(or the Dictator’s elicited belief) depending on the treatment condition. In the NO INFO-SOCIAL (T3) treatment the Player 
B column is hidden, in that Dictators make a decision for the pair without any information on the Recipients’ decisions in 
Stages 1 and 2.
3.7. Matching
Along the development of this research project, three are the matching protocols that have been used.9
1. Random Matching (RM). In this case, Dictators and Recipients are randomly matched, with no further restriction.
2. Dissortative Matching (DM). In this case, we use data from Stage 2 to compute the average switching point per subject 
across all 10 decision rounds, τ , where average switching point is taken as a proxy of individual discounting (the higher 
the switching point, the lower the discounting). We then match the most patient Dictator with the most impatient 
Recipient, the second most patient Dictator with the second most impatient Recipient, and so on. This design feature 
makes that Dictators are the most patient subjects in half of the couples, to provide suﬃcient dispersion/variability in 
the data minimize the possibility of matchings between subjects with very similar time preferences, thus making social 
preferences very diﬃcult to identify.
3. Eﬃcient Random Matching (ERM). In this case, we impose that consistent Dictators are randomly matched with consistent 
Recipients whenever possible. This design enhances eﬃciency of our structural estimation exercise (see Section 4.1.3).
Table 1 summarizes our treatment layout, including information on the number of sessions (by matching protocol) and 
the number of subjects (Dictators) in each of the treatments.
3.8. Financial rewards
All subjects receive e 10 just to show up. For the payment of Stages 1 and 2, we select at random one subject and one 
decision per session for payoff. By analogy, in Stage 3 we randomly pick one subject and one Stage 1 or Stage 2 prediction. 
A prize of e 100 is paid in case of a correct guess.10 As for Stage 4, we follow the same payment protocol as in Stage 2: 
8 Also Recipients go through the same sequence of decisions, although it is made clear in the instructions that Recipients’ decisions have no monetary 
consequences on either party.
9 We are grateful to two anonymous referees for expanding the scope of the paper and considering alternative matching protocols.
10 This, in turn, implies that our belief elicitation protocol is neutral to subjects’ degree of risk aversion (see Andersen et al., 2014a).
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Table 1
Treatment conditions.
Cod. Treat. Info Pay. ext. #Sessions (RM/DM/ERM) #Subj. (dict.)
T0 INFO-SOCIAL Yes Yes 6 (1/2/3) 288 (144)
T1 BELIEF-SOCIAL Beliefs Yes 2 (2/0/0) 96 (48)
T2 INFO-PRIVATE Yes No 3 (1/1/1) 144 (144)
T3 NO INFO-SOCIAL No Yes 2 (2/0/0) 96 (48)
Total 13 (6/3/4) 624 (384)
one matched pair and one decision is selected at random and both, the Dictator and the Recipient, are paid according to 
the Dictator’s choice.
All choices are paid at the end of the experiment, when we randomly select 2 subjects per stage for the payment of 
a randomly selected decision.11 The show-up fee and the decisions for Stages 1 and 3 are paid in cash on the same day 
of the experiment. By contrast, we take extreme care with the payment of Stages 2 and 4, as we are concerned with 
the transaction costs associated with receiving delayed payments (including physical costs and payment risk). To make 
all choices equivalent except for the timing dimension, all payments are made by way of a bank transfer to the subjects’ 
account. This is to minimize transaction costs and equalize them across periods, including payments for subjects who opt 
for the payment “today”.12 The dates of all delayed payments were set to avoid public holidays and weekends.
11 Although this method yields a compound lottery over the various stage decisions, there exists substantial evidence showing that this does not create a 
response bias (see, among others, Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Cubitt et al., 1998 and Hey and Lee, 2005).
12 We run all sessions at 10 a.m. to ensure that subjects would receive the bank transfer the same day of the experiment if this was selected for payment. 
To control for credibility in the payment method, we add a formal legal contract between the legal representative of the laboratory (LINEEX) and the 
subjects who were selected for payment. This contract is privately received by the subjects in an envelop and includes a formal statement on a 20% 
compensation if payments do not take place at the stated date.
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3.9. Debrieﬁng
All sessions end with a (computerized) debrieﬁng questionnaire including, among others,
1. standard socio-demographics, such as gender, that we code using the dummy variable Female that takes value 1 for 
females (it is 0 otherwise); the rooms/household size ratio, RSR, a standard proxy of the household wealth, together 
with the self-reported weekly budget, WB;
2. proxies of cognitive ability, such as Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT), a 3-item task of quantitative nature 
designed to measure the tendency to override an intuitive and spontaneous response alternative that is incorrect and 
to engage in further reﬂection that leads to the correct response;
3. proxies of social capital drawn from the World Values Survey, such as self-reported measures of individual happyness, or 
personal inclinations toward trust (see Glaeser et al., 2000) and inequality.
4. Results
Section 4.1 provides summary statistics of our behavioral data, stage by stage, while in Section 4.2 we perform a struc-
tural estimation exercise, where subjects’ risk, time and social preferences are framed within the realm of a parametric 
welfare function consisting in a convex linear combination between the Dictator’s and the Recipient’s “selﬁsh” utilities. 
Section 4.1.3 includes a discussion on the consistency of choices and how it affects our structural estimations.
4.1. Descriptive statistics
4.1.1. Stages 1 and 3: risk preferences
Fig. 4 plots the relative frequencies of subjects selecting the “safe” option (A) across all 11 lotteries in Stage 1 (all 
treatments) and Stage 3 (treatment BELIEF-SOCIAL). Fig. 4 also reports optimal choices under Risk Neutrality (RN), which 
correspond to the lottery with the highest expected value (i.e., Option A in the ﬁrst 5 decisions and Option B thereafter).13
As Fig. 4 shows, subjects display aggregate risk aversion, in that switching to Option B occurs at a slower pace, compared 
with the RN benchmark (p < 0.001) (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison and Rutström, 2008).14 As expected, we do not 
detect any signiﬁcant treatment conditions using the Krusall–Wallis test (p = 0.148).15
4.1.2. Stages 2 and 3: individual time preferences
Remember that, for each of the 10 delays, τ , subjects must identify the minimum amount of money (if any) they would 
need to receive in the future against the immediate bank transfer of e 100. Fig. 5 summarizes subjects’ behavior in stages 
13 Figure D1 in Appendix D reports the same information by matching protocol.
14 Unless otherwise stated, all reported p-values are derived from a (two-tail) Wilcoxon–Mann Whitney test between-subject and a Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test within-subject.
15 See Eckel and Grossman (2008).
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2 (all treatments) and 3 (treatment T1), with the vertical axis representing the distribution of “average switching points”, 
that is, the ﬁrst decision (out of a sequence of 20) for which subjects express their preference for the delayed payment.16
As Fig. 5 shows, average switching points decrease with delay (i.e., for increasing delays, subjects’ indifference interest 
rate goes down). This evidence contradicts (is consistent with) exponential (hyperbolic) discounting, respectively.
4.1.3. Inconsistent behavior
To the extent to which, in the structural estimations of Section 4.2, we frame subjects’ behavior within the realm of 
speciﬁc parametric models (along with all the implicit auxiliary assumptions that come with them), we are interested in a 
prior check on whether observed behavior satisﬁes basic consistency conditions compatible with our postulated theoretical 
setup.
In the MPL of Stage 1, standard behavioral restrictions (namely, monotonicity, ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance and tran-
sitivity) require that subjects who face the MPL of Stage 1 satisfy the following
Condition 1. A subject should choose option A in the ﬁrst row, option B in the last row, and switch from option A to B once 
– and once only – along the sequence.
We also look along similar lines at the intertemporal decisions of Stage 2. Remember that we force subjects to switch at 
most once within each MPL, i.e., consistency is artiﬁcially imposed within delays, τ , by the same experimental design. No 
further restriction is imposed by the experimental protocol when comparing choices across MPLs. In this respect, a natural 
requirement is contained in the following
Condition 2. If a subject prefers e 100 today against any higher amount e x at some point τ in the future, then, for all 
τ ′ > τ , she should never prefer ex′ < x against e 100 today.17
Fig. 6 reports an overview of our data with regard to inconsistent behavior, as deﬁned by both conditions 1 and 2. We 
consider four different categories, depending on whether subjects are in/consistent in the risk (Condition 1) and/or the 
time preference (Condition 2) task. As Fig. 6 shows, roughly 60% of our pool (352 subjects out of 624) passes both our 
consistency tests, and we cannot reject the null that the distribution of in/consistent subjects is the same across treatments 
(Krusall–Wallis test, two-tail: p = 0.98).
Motivated by the evidence of Fig. 6, we are interested in characterizing subjects’ inconsistency by way of the observable 
heterogeneity that can be inferred by the debrieﬁng questionnaire. To this aim, we ﬁrst partition our subject pool in four 
groups, depending on their risk (intertemporal) in/consistency, respectively. Since our two proxies of consistency are strongly 
correlated (Spearman Beta = 0.17, p < 0.01), Table 2 reports the estimates of i) the probability of being inconsistent in 
either task by way of a bivariate probit regression, where the set of covariates includes proxies from the questionnaire and 
16 If a subject always prefers the immediate payment, we assign this choice with “option 21”, which is also averaged out in Fig. 5. Appendix D2 reports 
the relative frequency of choices in favor of the immediate payment for each possible delay.
17 Condition 2 is akin to what Tanaka et al. (2010) deﬁne as “time-inconsistent behavior”.
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ii) the probability of failing at least one of our consistency tests (incDUMMY) against the same set of covariates by way of 
a standard logit regression.18 As it turns out, both gender and cognitive reﬂection play a key role in our estimations. This is 
why we include in the regressions an interaction term, and also report our estimations by males and females.
Our ﬁndings suggest a positive (negative) signiﬁcant effect of Female (CRT) on the likelihood of inconsistent behavior
in any of the two stages, as both marginal effects are highly signiﬁcant. When we condition our estimates on gender, we 
observe that CRT has a signiﬁcant (negative) effect, but only for females. By contrast, socio-demographics or social capital 
proxies have only a marginal impact in all regressions. This is consistent with previous results in the literature (take, e.g., 
Frederick, 2005 and Cueva et al., 2016).19
Once we have acquired a better grasp on the main determinants of inconsistent behavior, the next – rather delicate – 
question is what to do with those subjects who do not pass our consistency tests. This is because our behavioral paradigm – 
with speciﬁc reference to the structural estimations of Section 4.2 – imposes much stronger consistency conditions, whose 
violation may affect our numerical exercise in unexpected directions, whose interpretation goes well beyond the scope of 
this paper. In this respect, our analysis of individual behavior in Stages 1 to 3 (sections 4.1.4 and 4.2.1) follows the approach 
in Dean and Ortoleva (2012) or Sutter et al. (2013) in that we discard all observations from inconsistent subjects. This 
reduces our database to 352 subjects out of 624 (56%). As for the analysis of Dictators’ choices in Stage 4 (sections 4.1.4
and 4.2.2), we focus the analysis on those consistent Dictators who satisfy Conditions 1 and 2. This reduces our database 
to 210 subjects out of 384 (53%). As some of these consistent Dictators might have received information about inconsistent 
Recipients in the INFO-SOCIAL and the INFO-PRIVATE treatments, we control for the inconsistency of Recipients in the 
regressions of Table 6. Along similar lines, in our structural estimations we also check whether Dictators’ beliefs in treatment 
T1 satisfy the same consistency conditions. Table 3 summarizes the number of in/consistent pairs in each treatment. This 
includes information about consistent beliefs in treatment T1 and consistent Dictators in the NO INFO-SOCIAL treatment, 
where Dictators received no information about their matched Recipient.
As Table 3 shows, not only the majority of the pairs (210 out of 384, 55%) is characterized by a consistent Dictator – 
something we already know from Fig. 6 – but also that pairs with both consistent Dictators and Recipients are the majority 
within this subgroup (139 pairs out of 210: 66%). In treatments T0 and T2 this is partially due to the use of our ERM
matching protocol in some of the sessions (see Table 1).
4.1.4. Social motives vs. social inﬂuence. Some preliminary evidence
We begin our descriptive analysis of Stage 4 by looking at the difference between the intertemporal choices in Stage 2 
and 4, to be interpreted as a necessary condition for the existence of social motives/inﬂuence. Panel (a) of Fig. 7 reports 
the relative frequency of rounds where the decisions of consistent Dictators in Stages 4 differ from those in Stage 2. To 
assess the relative importance of social motives/inﬂuence, Panel (b) displays, for each time delay, the relative frequency of 
informed Dictators who change their choices in T0 (INFO-SOCIAL) vs. T2 (INFO-PRIVATE). Panel (c) looks directly at the 
focusing effect by showing the behavior in treatments with payoff externalities and no information (T1: BELIEF-SOCIAL vs.
18 The reported marginal effects follow the approach put forward by Ai and Norton (2003) and Karaca-Mandic et al. (2012) in the estimation of marginal 
effects in nonlinear models that include interaction terms. We also run a probit regression (not reported here) with qualitatively similar results.
19 The interested reader on the effects of cognitive reﬂection and gender in intertemporal preferences can look, among others, at Benjamin et al. (2013)





























347 347 347Table 2
In/consistent behavior: regression results.
Inconsistent (pooled data) Inconsistent (males)
Stage 1 Stage 2 incDUMMY Stage 1 Stage 2 incDUMMY
Logit estimates
Female 0.602∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.148) (0.215)
Cognitive reﬂection (CRT) −1.022∗∗∗ −0.033 −0.901∗ −1.015∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.903∗
(0.343) (0.322) (0.486) (0.341) (0.316) (0.488)
Interaction (Gender × CRT) −0.654 −1.430∗∗∗ −2.134∗∗∗
(0.490) (0.522) (0.767)
Weekly budget 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.002 −0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Room size ratio 0.158 0.175∗ 0.288* 0.102 0.151 0.322
(0.098) (0.093) (0.171) (0.148) (0.145) (0.264)
Happiness −0.834∗∗∗ −0.159 −1.013∗∗∗ −0.640∗∗ −0.407 −0.907∗
(0.218) (0.216) (0.339) (0.323) (0.329) (0.486)
Trust (general social survey) −0.494∗∗ 0.047 −0.339 −0.176 0.325 −0.069
(0.236) (0.274) (0.375) (0.368) (0.438) (0.567)
Inequality loving −0.861∗∗ −0.041 −0.844 −0.318 0.410 −0.262
(0.415) (0.484) (0.663) (0.663) (0.815) (1.051)
Constant 0.410 −1.174∗∗ 0.263 −0.141 −1.261∗ −0.317
(0.388) (0.475) (0.636) (0.580) (0.761) (0.951)
Marginal effects
Female 0.392∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.024) (0.029)
Cognitive reﬂection (CRT) −0.466∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗ −0.495∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.083) (0.077)
Obs. 624 624 624 277 277 277
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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Number of in/consistent pairs in each treatment.
T0 T1 T2 T3
INFO-SOCIAL BELIEF-SOCIAL INFO-PRIVATE NO INFO-SOCIAL POOL DATA
Consistent Dictators 80 (0.55) 30 (0.62) 79 (0.54) 21 (0.43) 210 (0.55)
Consistent pairs (Dictators and Recipients) 58 (0.40) 27 (0.56) 54 (0.37) . .
Consistent Dictators, inconsistent Recipients 22 (0.15) 3 (0.06) 25 (0.17) . .
Inconsistent Dictators (or Both Inconsistent) 64 (0.45) 18 (0.37) 65 (0.45) 27 (0.56) 174 (0.45)
Number of Dictators 144 48 144 48 384
Note. There is no information about the Recipient in T1 (BELIEF-SOCIAL) and T3 (NO-INFO-SOCIAL), but we report in the table the number of pairs in which 
consistent Dictators have a consistent/inconsistent belief in the former treatment.
Fig. 7. Dictators’ decisions in Stage 4.
T3: NO INFO-SOCIAL). Further evidence on the effect of eliciting beliefs is presented in Panel (d), where we show how 
consistent Dictators move their switching point into the direction of their beliefs in Stages 2 to 4 of treatment T1.
As Panel (a) shows, when Dictators are provided with information about the Recipients’ decisions, changes in behavior 
are more likely in the presence of payoff externalities (INFO-SOCIAL: 50.6% vs INFO-PRIVATE: 37.1%) while, in the absence 
of information, Dictators tend to change their behavior more frequently if beliefs are elicited (BELIEF-SOCIAL: 44.7% vs NO 
INFO-SOCIAL: 31.4%).20 Panels (b) and (c) conﬁrm this preliminary evidence disaggregating our observations by time delay. 
As Panel (b) shows, informed Dictators are more likely to change their decision when the latter has payoff consequences 
for the Recipients. Therefore social motives seem stronger than social inﬂuence (p < 0.004). On the other hand, Panel (c) 
20 Table D3 in Appendix D reports the estimated coeﬃcients of a probit regression on the likelihood of changing the decision in Stage 4 controlling for 
Dictactors’ individual characteristics.
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Choices of Dictators in Stage 4 compared with those of Recipients in Stage 2.
T0 T1 T2 T3
INFO-SOCIAL BELIEF-SOCIAL INFO-PRIVATE NO INFO-SOCIAL POOL DATA
(a) Frequency of Recipients’ choices matched by Dictators who moved their choices in Stage 4
Choices move towards the Recipients’ choices 0.67 0.56 0.56 0.29 0.29
Recipients’ choices are perfectly matched 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.06
Choices move against the Recipients’ choices 0.18 0.36 0.30 0.65 0.65
(b) Tobit regression on the switching point in Stage 4: ϕτP4 = (1− α)ϕτP2 + α ϕτP3
Estimates of alpha 0.262∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.050 0.186∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.146) (0.027) (0.041) (0.028)
Notes. In the Tobit regression, ϕτPk corresponds to the switching point of Dictators in Stage k = {2, 4} when the future payment is delayed τ days. The 
value of ϕτP3 denotes the switching of the matched Recipient or the Dictator’s elicited belief. Robust standard errors (clustered at the individual level) in 
parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
shows that, without information, eliciting beliefs seem to trigger social preferences, in that Dictators are more likely to 
change their choices in the BELIEF-SOCIAL compared with the NO-INFO-SOCIAL treatment (p < 0.096).21 This latter evidence 
is in line with the idea of “focusing” put forward by Krupka and Weber (2009), where belief elicitation has a positive 
effect on pro-social behavior. Finally, Panel (d) shows that Dictators believe that Recipients are more impatient than they 
are. Interestingly, Dictators in the BELIEF-SOCIAL treatment seem to weight their own preferences and beliefs about the 
Recipients’ preferences and choose a switching point in Stage 4 that is roughly between the two. This evidence is perfectly 
in line with our treatment of social time preferences.
In our paper, we are not only interested in detecting a change of behavior between stages 2 and 4, but also the direction
of such changes. One question to be addressed is then under which treatment the behavior of the Recipients is better 
matched by their assigned Dictator. In Panel (a) of Table 4 we disaggregate the evidence of Fig. 7(a) by looking, by treatment, 
at the relative frequency of Dictators’ choices that i) move toward, ii) perfectly match or iii) move against the Recipients’ 
choices (belief) of Stage 2 (3), respectively. As Table 4 shows, with the exception of T3, a clear majority of choices in Stage 4 
has changed with respect to Stage 2 in the direction of the Recipients’ preferences.22
Panel (b) of Table 4 provides a quantitative assessment on the statistical signiﬁcance of such changes by estimating a 
double censored tobit model (clustered for subjects) by which the switching point of Dictators in Stage 4, ϕτS4 ∈ {1, ...,21}, 
is calculated as a convex linear combination between own choices in Stage 2 (ϕτS2) and the information received or the 
Dictator’s elicited beliefs, (ϕτS3):
ϕτS4 = (1− α)ϕτS2 + αϕτS3 + ετ .
As Panel (b) shows, α is positive and highly signiﬁcant in all treatments with the exception of T3 (NO INFO-SOCIAL), this 
conﬁrming that Dictators’ thresholds move in the direction of those of their groupmates, once they know (or they reﬂect 
upon) the others’ time concerns.23 This effect seems stronger in the presence of payoff externalities (where social motives 
apply), but does not vanish without them, as a further sign of the empirical content of social inﬂuence, too. Consistently 
with our ﬁnding in Fig. 7, the estimated α is the highest (lowest) in the BELIEF-SOCIAL (NO INFO-SOCIAL) treatments, 
respectively. In this respect, framing the decision of the Dictator as an explicit choice between two selves – whether actual or 
simply ﬁctitious – seems to work as a necessary condition for a detectable change in behavior in the direction of the other’s 
decision. When we look at the intertemporal choices of Stage 4, we indeed ﬁnd that Dictators are more likely to follow their 
own choices of Stage 2 in the INFO-PRIVATE compared with the INFO-SOCIAL (p = 0.019) treatment. Similarly, Dictators are 
more likely to follow their own choices in the NO-INFO-SOCIAL compared with the BELIEF-SOCIAL treatment (p < 0.037) 
(see Appendix D3).
4.2. Structural estimations
The estimates of Table 4 show a signiﬁcant shift in the direction of the Recipient’s decision, conditional upon i) the 
provision of some explicit information (or belief) about the latter’s decision, and/or ii) a modiﬁcation of the incentive 
structure to experimentally induce payoff externalities. These considerations notwithstanding, the estimates of Table 4 look 
at our behavioral evidence on intertemporal decisions only, disregarding the information on individual risk preferences 
collected in Stage 1. As we already discussed in Section 2, this may introduce a confound – namely, Dictators’ heterogeneity 
in own risk concerns – that our own experimental design can, indeed, control for. This is the reason why we test the 
21 When doing pairwise comparisons, we compute, for each Dictator, the frequency of rounds in which the decision was changed and treat each Dictator 
as an independent observation. All our ﬁndings are robust if we restrict our sample to consistent pairs instead of consistent Dictators.
22 See Figure D3 in Appendix D for the same evidence disaggregated by time delays.
23 The estimated coeﬃcient for the NO INFO-SOCIAL treatment makes sense only within the realm of some “rational expectation” hypothesis, since 
Dictators are never informed about their matched Recipient’s decision. Nevertheless, we report the T3 estimated coeﬃcient for the sake of completeness, 
and also for a direct comparison with that of T1, where also Dictators are not informed, but their beliefs about the Recipients’ decisions are elicited.
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Risk and time preferences: structural models of individual behavior (Stages 1 to 3).
(1) Exponential discounting (2) Hyperbolic discounting (3) Mixture model
Risk (ρ) Time (δ) Risk (ρ) Time (δ) Time (β) Risk (ρ) Time (δ) Time (β) π
Private “own” decisions (Stages 1 and 2)
Pooled data 0.853∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.099) (0.008) (0.026) (0.007) (0.009) (0.025) (0.014) (0.019)
INFO-SOCIAL (T0) 0.874∗∗∗ 1.133∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.215) (0.012) (0.033) (0.011) (0.014) (0.028) (0.026) (0.035)
BELIEF-SOCIAL (T1) 0.859∗∗∗ 1.133∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.214) (0.020) (0.069) (0.022) (0.024) (0.065) (0.025) (0.063)
INFO-PRIVATE (T2) 0.829∗∗∗ 1.179∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 1.151∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.132) (0.015) (0.062) (0.013) (0.019) (0.050) (0.023) (0.032)
NO INFO-SOCIAL (T3) 0.825∗∗∗ 1.682∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 1.352∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.231) (0.021) (0.072) (0.016) (0.026) (0.088) (0.023) (0.048)
Beliefs about Recipients (Stage 3)
BELIEF-SOCIAL (T1) 0.809∗∗∗ 1.259∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 1.368∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.163) (0.021) (0.103) (0.021) (0.026) (0.061) (0.048) (0.063)
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
robustness of our previous ﬁndings by means of some structural estimations in which we frame (consistent) Dictators’ 
behavior as maximizing various parametric random utility functions, some related with the individual decisions of stages 1 
to 3, others which include both the individual (“selﬁsh”) utilities of the Dictator and the Recipient as a result of some social 
preference – or social inﬂuence – process of joint utility maximization, depending on the treatment.
To this aim, we follow Andersen et al. (2006) by conditioning our estimations upon the following stationarity condition:
ui(M0) = 
i(τ )ui(Mτ ), (1)
where ui(x) = x1−ρi/(1 − ρi) is a standard (time independent) CRRA utility function and ρi = 1 is the risk aversion coeﬃ-
cient. With this parametrization, ρi = 0 identiﬁes risk neutrality, with ρi > 0 (ρi < 0) identifying risk aversion (risk loving) 
behavior, respectively. As in Coller et al. (2012), the discount factor is assumed to be 
i(τ ) = βi/(1 + δi)τ , with βi = 1
(βi < 1) in the case of exponential (hyperbolic) discounting, respectively. The estimations we report in the remainder of 
this paper follow a standard “maximum likelihood” approach, by which the estimated parameters (jointly) maximize the 
likelihood of observed choices in the different stages of the experiment, conditional on the structural parametrization (1)
and the auxiliary assumption that choices made by the same subject across different stages are statistically independent.24
In Section 4.2.1 we collect pool estimates of (own) risk (ρ) and intertemporal preferences (β and δ) using the evidence 
from Stages 1 to 3. As for social time preferences/inﬂuence, Section 4.2.2 estimates the weights of a social welfare func-
tion where individual (own) risk and discounting parameters are estimated separately for each subject participating to the 
experiment.
4.2.1. Stages 1–3: individual choices
Table 5 replicates Table 2 in Coller et al. (2012) by estimating pool parameters of our structural model (1) using obser-
vation from stages 1 to 3. Model 1 imposes β = 1; i.e., it assumes exponential discounting for all observations. We remove 
this assumption in Model 2, which allows for hyperbolic discounting. Finally, we consider in Model 3 a “binary mixture 
model” that estimates – jointly with the other behavioral parameters, ρ , δ and β – the ex-ante probabilities, denoted by 
π (1 − π ), that each individual observation is an independent draw from Model 2 (Model 1), respectively. The last line of 
Table 5 replicates our structural estimations using the evidence from Stage 3 of the BELIEF-SOCIAL treatment.25
We look ﬁrst at the pool estimations (ﬁrst row of Table 5). Our estimates for Model 1 qualitatively conﬁrm those of 
Coller et al. (2012) in that our (consistent) subjects exhibit signiﬁcant CRRA and discounting. Similar considerations hold 
for Model 2: β is signiﬁcantly smaller than 1, thus providing empirical content to the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis. 
By the same token, the estimated value of δ signiﬁcantly drops with respect to the estimate of Model 1, as it occurs in 
Coller et al. (2012). When we consider the mixture Model 3, deﬁned as the probability-weighted average of exponential and 
hyperbolic discounting, we ﬁnd that the probability of the latter model being the correct one, π , is estimated to be around 
23% and highly signiﬁcant. In this sense, we reject the null by which choices can be explained by exponential discounting 
only.26 The estimates of the three models disaggregated by treatment suggest little variability across treatments, since we 
24 A detailed description of our identiﬁcation strategy is presented in Appendix A.
25 As we explained in Section 3, our belief scoring rule is neutral to the (CRRA) risk aversion parametrization, since subjects either win the price when 
they guess correctly, otherwise they get nothing. As a consequence, maximizing expected payoffs is equivalent to maximizing winning probabilities (i.e., 
our scoring rule only serves the purpose of eliciting the mode of subjects’ belief distribution). Under the assumption that subjects formulate their beliefs 
using the behavioral model in equation (1) that we use to frame their own behavior, we can map subjects’ beliefs into the same (ρ, δ) behavioral space.
26 We also note that our estimate for π is signiﬁcantly lower than the one reported by Coller et al. (2012) (point estimate: 0.59; std. err. 0.07; 95% 
conﬁdence interval (0.45, 0.74)). This, in turn, seems to be in line with Andersen et al. (2014b), where it is suggested that present-bias preferences may 
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can never reject the null of joint equality of the estimated coeﬃcients across treatments. Our estimates for Stage 3 in 
T1 show that ρ (δ) is not as high (low) as the corresponding estimate for Stage 2, which is in line with the descriptive 
statistics of Section 4.1: subjects believe that their groupmates are less risk averse and more impatient (for all models, 
the corresponding differences are always signiﬁcant at at least 5 % conﬁdence). Interestingly enough, our mixture model 
estimates reveal that subjects’ beliefs underestimate the relevance of hyperbolic discounting in their groupmates’ decisions, 
as the estimated value for β is signiﬁcantly smaller.
We now move to between-subject heterogeneity, which we study by estimating our equation (1) for each consistent 
subject. Due to lack of observations at the individual level, we can only get estimates for Model 1, where we impose 
exponential discounting. Let δˆ = 11+δ denote the individual discount factor. Fig. 8 reports the scatter diagram of the estimated 
(δˆ, ρ) pairs characterizing each consistent subject participating to the experiment.
As Fig. 8 shows, risk (ρ) and time (δˆ) preferences are strongly correlated: more risk averse subjects turn out to be also more 
patient. If we calculate the Spearman correlation coeﬃcient between δˆ and ρ we get a value of 0.78 (p < 0.0001). In this 
respect, our evidence is consistent with that of Dean and Ortoleva (2012), Burks et al. (2009) and Epper et al. (2011).
4.2.2. Stage 4: social motives vs. social inﬂuence
Dictators’ choices in Stage 4 are framed as maximizing a welfare function consisting of a convex linear combination be-
tween their own and their assigned Recipient’s risk and intertemporal concerns (precisely, the individual speciﬁc parameters 
reported in Fig. 8):













where ρ j and 
 j(τ ) correspond to the risk and discount individual parameters of i’s assigned Recipient, j. In this respect, 
our estimation strategy consists in two steps. We ﬁrst estimate, the maximum-likelihood individual parameter proﬁle (ρi , δi) 
estimated using data from Stages 1 and 2, together with the elicited beliefs in Stage 3 for those subjects participating in 
the BELIEF-SOCIAL treatment. Once we have obtained individual estimates for each subject, we estimate the probabilities 
that any given consistent Dictator i in Stage 4 resolves the same sequence of intertemporal decisions assuming that i
is maximizing the welfare function (2), derived as the convex linear combination between the utilities of Dictator i and 
Recipient j, whether using directly j’s estimated parameters (treatments INFO-SOCIAL and INFO-PRIVATE), or the elicited 
parameters of Stage 3 (treatment BELIEF-SOCIAL).27
Table 6 reports our estimation results. Panel (a) does not condition on whether a consistent Dictator is matched with 
an in/consistent Recipient. Panel (b) estimates a constant and a coeﬃcient associated with a dummy which is positive 
for matchings between consistent Dictators and inconsistent Recipients. In other words, the constant identiﬁes the value 
of α resulting from matchings between consistent Dictators and Recipients, while the dummy measures the effect, for a 
consistent Dictator, to be matched with an inconsistent Recipient.
We look at Model (a) ﬁrst. Here we see that – somewhat in line with the descriptive statistics of Section 4.1.4 – the 
estimated value of α is positive in all cases. However, it is signiﬁcant (at 1% conﬁdence) for treatment T0 (INFO-SOCIAL) and 
be less prominent than previously suggested by the literature. One possible factor driving our results is that we exclude inconsistent Dictators from the 
analysis, what may indeed affect our estimates of hyperbolic discounting (see Meier and Sprenger, 2015 for a discussion along these lines).
27 Dictators do not receive any information (nor we elicit their beliefs) in the NO INFO-SOCIAL treatment, therefore equation (2) cannot be identiﬁed in 
T3.
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Structural model.
TR_0 TR_1 TR_2 POOL
INFO-SOCIAL BELIEF-SOCIAL INFO-PRIVATE
(a) Estimates of α for Consistent Dictators (CD)
Const. 0.739∗∗∗ 0.612 0.394∗ 0.527
(0.214) (0.999) (0.204) (0.413)
(b) Estimates of α for Consistent Dictators, conditioned on (In)Consistent Recipients
Const. 0.758∗∗∗ 0.612 0.101 0.245
(0.270) (0.999) (0.102) (0.457)
Inc. Rec. −0.070 N/A 0.769∗∗∗ 0.589
(0.292) (0.113) (0.469)
Notes. Robust standard errors (clustered at the individual level) in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
signiﬁcant only at 10% conﬁdence in the case of T2 (INFO-PRIVATE). Things are different when we condition our estimates 
to the consistency of the Recipient. As Panel (b) shows, the estimate of the constant in T0 remains positive and highly 
signiﬁcant. The same does not happen in T2, where we cannot reject the null of absence of social inﬂuence in our data as 
for the matchings between consistent Dictators and Recipients are concerned. By contrast, the effect of being matched with 
an inconsistent Recipient is negligible (highly signiﬁcant) in T0 (T2), respectively. This suggests that social motives are more 
important than social inﬂuence when we only consider pairs composed by consistent Dictators and Recipients. Along these 
lines, we ﬁnd that the effect of being matched with an inconsistent Recipient is only signiﬁcant for T2 , which explains why 
the unconditional estimate of Model (a) for T2 is signiﬁcant. By contrast, we cannot reject the null for the INFO-SOCIAL data, 
which indicates that behavior of consistent Dictators in T0 does not seem to vary signiﬁcantly depending on the consistency 
of their assigned Recipient.
To summarize, once we control for the Dictators’ and Recipients’ estimated risk aversion, both the effects of the social 
inﬂuence and focusing seem to lose force, compared with our social motives motivating theme. In particular, the estimated 
parameter in T1 is never signiﬁcant, while in T2 is (marginally) signiﬁcant only when we do not condition on the consis-
tency of the Recipient.
5. Conclusion
Using evidence from a laboratory experiment, we have tested several complementary working conjectures on the inﬂu-
ence of others in individual intertemporal decisions. According to the “social inﬂuence” conjecture, being simply acknowl-
edged of the choices of someone else is suﬃcient to trigger a change in behavior; according to the “focusing” conjecture, 
forcing subjects to form beliefs over the time preferences of others is suﬃcient to move behavior in the direction of beliefs. 
Our motivating conjecture, instead, calls for social time preferences as a result of some conscious deliberation in which the 
others’ intertemporal concerns are explicitly taken into account when decisions yield payoff externalities.
To different degrees, the descriptive analysis of Section 4.1.4 supports all these working conjectures, as changes in be-
havior (in the direction of the Recipient) are more likely in the presence of i) information about others’ decisions (even 
in absence of any payoff externality), ii) belief elicitation (even in absence of any information about others’ decisions) and 
iii) payoff externalities (especially in conjunction with information about others’ decisions). The structural estimations of 
Section 4.2, however, favor social motives with respect to the other competing conjectures, especially when we restrict our 
attention to consistent pairs of Dictators and Recipients, that is, an environment more in tune with a well deﬁned process 
of conscious deliberation. However, it should be noticed that i) this result has been obtained at the cost of a drastic re-
duction in the sample size, leaving unexplained the behavior of signiﬁcant fraction of our subject pool and ii) since our 
structural model has been tailored around our social time preference working hypothesis, it is far from straightforward how 
to interpret equation (2) within the realm of a model of “social cues” (“focusing”), in absence of a compelling structural link 
between the motives (the actions) of Dictators and Recipients, respectively.
As for avenues for future research, we consider our results as groundwork for exploring endogenous matching processes, 
where people – when considering intertemporal decisions with payoff externalities – may cluster or delegate time decisions 
depending on others’ (risk and) time preferences.
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